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Abstract: David Rosenthal, in his Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of 
consciousness, argues that it is a higher-order thought to the effect that the subject 
is in a conscious state that makes one conscious of his or her own mental states. In 
this paper, I argue that since phenomenal consciousness can be vague and 
Rosenthal’s HOT cannot, HOT is not a necessary condition of phenomenal 
consciousness. I use primarily Ned Blocks’ refrigerator hum case and Sartre’s 
example of non-positional awareness to argue that the threshold which determines 
the degree of first-person awareness necessary for a mental state to be conscious 
is vague itself, therefore consciousness is a vague concept. HOT cannot 
accommodate for borderline cases of phenomenal consciousness, therefore it 
cannot be a necessary condition of all conscious mental states. This is especially 
relevant in the discussion of non-human animal consciousness, as HOT theories 
such as Carruthers have been used to deny non-human animal consciousness on 
the basis of the on/off feature of such representational theories.  
 
Introduction 
Within the field of philosophy, the topic of consciousness has been approached 
widely by both continental and analytic philosophy. Although consciousness is defined in 
various ways, it is generally agreed upon that the “mystery” of consciousness is in 
understanding the “what it’s like”1 feeling of existence. Each branch of the discipline has 
attempted to grapple with a fundamental question: how consciousness comes to be in the 
mind and, more specifically, how it comes to give us our particular first-person 
experience of ourselves and the world. In this thesis, I am beginning a project of bringing 
continental thought into conversation with more contemporary philosophy of mind 
theories on phenomenal consciousness in order to question the commonly held belief that 
consciousness is an all or nothing phenomena of mental states. This is particularly 
                                                 
1 See Thomans Nagel’s What it is like to be bat (1974) 
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important for the discussion of animal rights, as non-human animals with less or different 
cognitive capacities than human beings ought to be included in the discussion of 
consciousness. I will not be engaging in the discussion on animal consciousness of 
animal rights in this paper, but it is the driving force behind my objection to higher-order 
thought theory of consciousness and a topic that I will continue to develop in the future.  
Representational theories of consciousness began as early as Immanuel Kant in 
his theory of “transcendental apperception” (Schwyzer, p. 344). Kant argues that a 
subject’s experience is given through perception. Perception from the external world is 
given to the subject through representation. Kant calls this concept apperception, which is 
the way that our inner sensory states perceive and represent the external world to us: this 
is what forms our ability to have thoughts about the world. Kant uses the term 
“transcendental apperception” (Schwyzer, 344) to describe the inner sense of self we 
have prior to thought; he makes a critical movement away from Descartes’ Cartesian 
dualism in his distinction between the ‘I’ which thinks and the ‘I’ which undergoes 
experiences via representation (Kant 1724-1804, VII, 161). Since Kant, theories of 
representation have played a major role in the philosophy of mind and consciousness, 
specifically in explaining the distinction between states which we experience consciously 
and states which are not conscious.  
Representational theories of consciousness have been so influential in philosophy 
of mind because they provide a way in which to understand this significant difference 
between mental states that we experience from the first-person perspective and mental 
states which are not experienced by the first-person perspective. This awareness that we 
have of our own mental states is generally called “phenomenal consciousness”. One of 
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the most well received representational theories in philosophy of mind has been David 
Rosenthal’s Higher Order Thought theory of consciousness. The HOT theory of 
consciousness (HOT) provides a compelling way to understand phenomenal 
consciousness as mental representations of lower-order states to a subject which 
experiences these representations (Rosenthal, 1997, 2002, 2009). Lower-order states are 
perceptual states which are unconscious, meaning that they have not yet been represented 
by a higher order thought. Rosenthal proposes that HOT is a necessary condition of 
phenomenal consciousness because it is a thought which represents mental states to the 
self. Without such thoughts, there could not exist a “what it’s like”2 quality of experience, 
such as the experience of seeing red or tasting an apple.  
However, for sensory or perceptual experience in particular, HOT theory 
confronts a problem. The HOT model is supposed to explain why we feel sensations such 
as pain, hunger, emotions, etc. by claiming that a mental state is necessary for the first-
person experience of these perceptions (Rosenthal 2009, 3). There is a “subject of 
experience” to which every perceptual experience is represented via HOT: this subject of 
experience is either conscious of the perception or not. This binary, in turn, determines 
whether the perception itself is conscious or unconscious. Rosenthal refers to this subject 
as the apparent “unity of the self”. We have the subjective impression of a singular, 
contiguous self that persists through time and space (Rosenthal, 328). According to 
Rosenthal, this subjective impression we have of a singular, united self requires 
explanation, and HOT offers an understanding of the conscious self as something that 
exists and persists via higher-order representation. The HOT preserves this subjective 
                                                 
2 Nagel’s understanding of phenomenal consciousness from “What is it like to be a bat?” 
 7 
impression by proposing that perceptual experience is only conscious when the subject is 
aware of it by virtue of a mental representation of a HOT.  
 
 
However, for perceptual experience-- especially in cases of bodily experience 
such as pain, visual experience, or taste--there exist cases in which it cannot be 
determined whether the subject’s awareness of the experience reaches the threshold of a 
conscious perceptual state. Most perceptual experience is not determinably conscious or 
unconscious because it is experienced in degrees of first-person awareness and attention. 
At what point does the amount of first-person, subjective awareness of a perceptual 
experience reach the threshold of a conscious perception? As the threshold itself is vague, 
it remains impossible to determine what degree of first-person awareness would be 
required to interpret conscious perceptual states.  
The existence of borderline cases of consciousness with respect to this subject of 
consciousness undermines HOT theory, particularly as it pertains to perceptual or sensory 
experience. There are cases in which the subject is not directly aware of his or her 
experience from the first person perspective, but nonetheless still arguably experiences a 
form of consciousness; and since there is no quantitative method to the determination, 
there are no clear answers to the question of whether these experiences are conscious. 
Again, since there is no agreed upon, empirical understanding of the threshold at which a 
state becomes conscious beyond our first-person experience of it, in some cases it cannot 
be determined whether a state which has, for example, a low degree of awareness from 
the first-person perspective is conscious or unconscious. I refer to these states as 
 8 
“borderline” perceptual experience. Rosenthal presents consciousness as an ‘all or 
nothing’ phenomenon, but if it is not, and partial awareness exists, then HOT cannot be a 
necessary condition of phenomenal consciousness.  
The ramifications of HOT are significant beyond our borderline perceptual 
experiences. Notably, some HOT theories have used HOT to deny animal consciousness. 
The argument is generally structured as follows: most non-human animals (excluding 
chimpanzees and other mammals with more comparably developed mental capacities to 
humans) do not have the cognitive capacities required to have HOTs, and are therefore 
unable to experience conscious states. According to Peter Carruthers, a proponent of the 
“Dispositionalist” HOT theory, most non-human animals experience their perceptual 
states in a similar way to how humans experience their unconscious, because they lack 
the capacity necessary to experience mental awareness of their own perceptual states. He 
claims the following about the “feel” of being a non-human animal in his book 
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory, in which he argues for an 
evolutionary account of consciousness in humans: 
If animal experiences are not phenomenally conscious...then their states will lack feel. 
But if the pains of animals, too, lack feel, then doesn’t that mean that animals don’t feel 
them?...There is no real objection to HOR theory here...merely an ambiguity in the term 
“feel”...The relational property of feeling pain can thus be understood in purely first-
order and non-phenomenological terms, just as can the property of seeing red, [but]...we 
can (and should) deny that the pains which animals feel are phenomenally conscious 
ones. So we should deny that animal pains have subjective feels to them, or are like 
anything to undergo...In fact the idea of a feeling of pain which lacks feel is no more 
problematic than the idea of a percept of red which lacks feel... (Carruthers 2000, pp. 
200-201) 
 
According to Carruthers, having a HOT requires a conceptual understanding of 
self which most animals lack. Specifically, animals do not have a “theory of mind” which 
allows them to mentally distinguish a “self” that is the owner of such mental experiences 
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beyond just a stream of experience (Allen 2004, 627)3. It is unclear whether Rosenthal 
shares the same view about non-human animal consciousness, but he does claim that 
intentional states such as HOT only require “little conceptual richness” (Rosenthal 2002, 
418) because the sense of self only needs to involve a differentiation between self and 
other. Regardless of whether Rosenthal considers non-human animals to have the 
cognitive capacity necessary for HOT, the argument that HOT is a necessary condition 
for phenomenal consciousness clearly has dangerous implications for our treatment of 
non-human animals, particularly those that have a more minimal sense or concept of self. 
Although this paper will not focus on how HOT denies animal consciousness, it is the 
driving force behind my objection to Rosenthal’s claim that HOT is a necessary condition 
for phenomenal consciousness.  
 
In this paper, I will be objecting to Rosenthal’s claim that HOT is a necessary 
condition of phenomenal consciousness. First, I offer a more detailed description of 
Rosenthal’s argument regarding HOT and its role in our subjective experience of 
perceptual states. I will then argue that because borderline cases of phenomenal 
consciousness exist, and HOT does not have borderline cases, HOT cannot be a 
necessary condition of phenomenal consciousness.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Allen, in his argument against Carruthers Animal Pain (2004), does not define what it means to have a 
“theory of mind”, but Carruthers has a naturalistic account of what it entails that focuses on evolutionary 
processes which distinguish the range of mental experiences biologically available to non-human animals 
(excluding chimpanzees) from humans. See generally Carruthers (2000) Phenomenal Consciousness: A 
Naturalistic Theory. 
 10 
I. Rosenthal’s HOT Theory of Consciousness 
The HOT theory of consciousness proposes that a state is conscious if and only if 
it is represented to the self by a higher order thought (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 7). Rosenthal’s 
definition of conscious mental states rests upon what he calls the “transitivity principle”, 
which claims that a mental state is only conscious if “one is conscious of that state in 
some suitable way” (Rosenthal 2009, p. 2). If a subject is in a mental state which the 
subject is not aware of being in, that state is not conscious. There must be something it is 
like for the subject to be in that conscious state. Rosenthal claims that any theory of 
consciousness must account for the difference between states which have this what it’s 
like quality and states which do not (Rosenthal 2009, p. 8). Therefore, for Rosenthal, 
consciousness is phenomenal consciousness.  
According to Rosenthal, HOT is a necessary condition for phenomenal 
consciousness (Rosenthal, 2002, p. 407). This claim avoids the overly simple conclusion 
that consciousness is simply an innate feature of our mental states. However, it also 
avoids confronting an infinite regress. The infinite regress problem is defined by 
Rosenthal himself:   
If we are to “explain what it is for any mental state to be conscious except in terms of 
another mental state, whose being conscious itself requires explanation. We will end up 
appealing to indefinitely many mental states, each of them conscious, in order to explain 
what it is for a single mental state itself to be conscious” (Rosenthal, 1997, p. 235).   
 
The infinite regress problem, and specifically the vicious infinite regress problem, 
asks how a mental state can cause a conscious state without an infinite amount of 
previous consciousness- causing states. However, since HOT is not phenomenally 
available to the subject, it is an unconscious thought. The HOT itself must be something 
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unconscious and external to the mental states that it represents. He claims that "from the 
first-person point of view nothing mediates between the conscious states we are 
conscious of and our transitive consciousness of them” (Rosenthal 2002, p. 408). The fact 
that we do not experience the HOT directly is evidence of its lack of conscious existence.  
The content of this HOT, which occurs alongside every conscious mental state 
(Rosenthal 2002, p. 409), is that the subject is “in that very state” it currently experiences. 
(Rosenthal 2002, p. 409). Being aware of a state is a “necessary condition for that state to 
be a conscious state”, and the HOT is what provides this awareness (Rosenthal 2002, p. 
407). However, the HOT is not the same as the mental state it accompanies or the 
conscious state itself; it is the mechanism that allows a lower-order perceptual state, 
which is not accessible to the first-person perspective, to be conscious to the subject 
(Rosenthal 2002, p. 410). Rosenthal admits that the existence of a thought which has no 
content beyond being in that lower-order state may seem “psychologically superfluous” 
(Rosenthal 2009, 9). However, he argues that that HOT is not a mere replication of the 
lower-order state; rather, it is a representation of the state. Its content is not the lower-
order state itself but a thought about the lower-order state (Rosenthal, 2009, p. 9) 
 The exact characteristic of a “thought” is defined by Rosenthal as any intentional 
stae which has “an assertoric mental attitude” (Rosenthal, 2002, p. 410). However, a 
conscious mental state does not have to be reported to the self continually in order to be 
conscious; the qualitative content of our mental states such as perception, emotion, and 
even reasoning processes can be experienced by the subject without explicit first-person 
knowledge that they are being experienced (Rosenthal 2009, p. 241). An example of 
something that is conscious but that lacks this constant mental reporting is the perception 
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of color. When I see red, I do not immediately have the thought “I see red”, but I do have 
a distinct phenomenal experience both of the color red as being red and as myself as 
perceiving it in this way (Rosenthal 2002, p. 411). There is a sense of ownership of the 
experience along with the experience.  
Put simply, a state is conscious when a HOT represents a lower-order state to the 
self as belonging to the self. The conditions of having phenomenal consciousness for 
Rosenthal can thus be characterized as the following.  
      1.  Has the content of thinking one to be in a conscious state (Rosenthal 2002, p. 
409) 
2. Accompanies every conscious state (Rosenthal, 2002, p. 7) 
3. Is not conscious itself (Rosenthal 1997, p. 235) 
4. Takes the lower-order state as its target (Rosenthal, 1997, p.164) 
5. Makes the self aware of a lower-order state as belonging to the self (Rosenthal 
1997, p. 164) 
 
Since the content of a HOT is a thought that the subject is in a conscious state, there must 
be a subject to experience that conscious state. As elaborated upon below, these 
limitations lead to a problem for HOT when approaching mental states in which the first-
person subject is not fully present or aware of the mental state. If HOT is a necessary 
condition for conscious mental states, it cannot account for cases in which it is 
indeterminable whether the subject is experiencing a fully conscious state. I will address 
this issue in my next chapter on borderline cases of phenomenal consciousness.  In that 
chapter, I argue that because there are no borderline cases of HOT, it cannot be a 
necessary condition of phenomenal consciousness.  
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II. Borderline Cases and HOT 
2.1  HOT as belief-like mental state without borderline cases 
In order to introduce the objection to HOT from borderline cases, I will first 
attempt to characterize HOT in terms of being a quasi-belief, or a belief like state. 
Although it does not share all the same characteristics as belief, it still resembles belief in 
certain significant ways that makes it necessary to distinguish it from thought, as thought 
is such a broad category of mental states. Some things that are thoughts would not 
capture the sort of mental state that Rosenthal is proposing for HOT. Rosenthal’s first 
criterion for HOT is that the HOT has the content of thinking that one is in a particular 
mental state (Rosenthal 2002, 409). According to Rosenthal, to be in a conscious state the 
HOT must have the content of representing that the self is in that very state. He gives the 
analogous example of wine tasting; when wine tasting one can gain new thoughts about 
flavor by directing their attention towards the nuances in the flavor. These new learned 
thoughts manifest in having new sensory experiences of wine (Rosenthal 2002, 413).  
Presumably, these sensory experiences already existed, but by becoming actively aware 
of them through specific ‘thought’ about the sensations brought about by that taste, the 
subject is now aware of these new sensory experiences (Rosenthal 2002, 413). Similarly, 
HOT presents a new ‘thought’ about an existing lower-order state that develops into a 
conscious mental state. 
Rosenthal describes this lower-order experience as “subliminal perception and 
peripheral vision” that present no phenomenal quality (Rosenthal 2002, 411). Thus, it 
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seems appropriate to hold that since phenomenal consciousness is the result of a HOT, it 
is in effect the result of a new thought about a lower-order experience. This “new 
thought” I will characterize as a belief-like state for the following reasons. Rosenthal 
states that the HOT is assertoric (Rosenthal 1993, 913), meaning that it asserts that 
something is the case. An assertion that something is the case is the same thing as having 
a belief, as a belief is a thought that something is true. Saying a belief that something is 
the case is therefore redundant. Rosenthal says that the HOT cannot be a kind of thought 
which is not assertoric, such as a doubt:  
“When we are conscious of something by being in an intentional state about that thing, 
the state's mental attitude is always assertoric; doubting does not make one conscious of 
anything” (Rosenthal 2009, 12). 
 
Other thoughts such as desiring, wishing, and hoping not only fail to meet the 
standard for assertoric--they would not perform the function of representation. They are 
not assertoric because they do not represent that something is the case. A thought such as 
a desire asserts a feeling or consideration of one’s relation with the external world. A 
belief on the other hand picks out something with more conviction or confidence. In other 
words, a belief is an assertion that something is already the case without anything further 
happening. By contrast, a desire is a thought about a potentiality. “I desire to be in a 
conscious state C” does not suggest the same confidence about an actuality as “I believe I 
am in a conscious state C”, regardless of the extent of my confidence that I desire it. 
Therefore, desiring to have been in conscious state C would not make me conscious of C. 
I will consider it synonymous to say subject S asserts P and subject S believes P, as an 
assertion of a statement suggests that the subject believes that statement. Belief is the 
most plausible candidate for the kind of thought Rosenthal is suggesting for the HOT.  
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So, a subject is in a conscious mental state in the case that there is an accompanying 
belief-like state to the effect that the subject is in this conscious mental state (Rosenthal 
1986, 334). Therefore, I will characterize HOT as a belief-like state to the effect that one 
is in a conscious state.  
My objection to Rosenthal’s conditions for phenomenal consciousness is that if 
phenomenal consciousness admits vagueness, then HOT cannot be a necessary condition. 
If the HOT is a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness (PC)4, then a belief-
like thought that one is in a conscious state must occur for every mental state that is PC. 
However, I will argue that PC has borderline cases which the HOT cannot account for, as 
there are not borderline cases of HOT.  
Rosenthal’s HOT theory does not account for the vagueness of phenomenal 
consciousness. According to HOT theory, a mental state is either conscious or 
unconscious; there is no in between. As soon as a lower-order state has been represented 
by HOT, it is conscious. However, phenomenal consciousness suffers from the same 
problem that standards for baldness or tallness do in that the characterization of these 
concepts is dependent on terms that we use to pick out certain contextual truths. There is 
not objective threshold for baldness in the world; rather it is a term we use to describe 
someone who appears a certain way, regardless of whether there are two hairs or five 
hairs on someone’s head. If there are concrete standards (for example, if we say bald is 5 
or less hairs), these are arbitrary in that they do not pick out any objective truth about 
baldness. Borderline cases, such as having a head with 8 hairs on it in which the subject 
                                                 
4 I will use conscious state and phenomenally conscious state interchangeably regarding Rosenthal, as 
consciousness for Rosenthal is phenomenal 
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could be either bald or not bald characterizes the type of case in which no amount of 
empirical evidence or inquiry could measure its truth-value.  
As previously described, a borderline case of consciousness is one in which it is 
not determinable whether a state is conscious or unconscious, according to the governing 
standards. As with the baldness case, it is indeterminable from any cultural or 
neuroscientific understanding of consciousness at which point exactly a state transitions 
from unconscious to conscious. According to Rosenthal, this transition occurs with the 
accompaniment of a HOT. Earlier we defined the HOT as a type of belief that one is in a 
conscious state. Therefore, phenomenal consciousness is a result of a type of belief that 
one is in a conscious state. However, being the result of this type of belief that one is in a 
conscious state cannot have borderline cases. A state is either the result of such a belief or 
it is not, therefore, a state would have to be either conscious or unconscious if we take 
HOT to be a necessary condition of consciousness. HOT forces a binary construct: a state 
is either the result of such a belief or it is not, and therefore, a state would have to be 
either conscious or unconscious if HOT is a necessary condition of consciousness. 
However, there are compelling reasons to believe that belief has borderline cases, 
which I will outline in the following passages. For this reason, I will consider a HOT to 
be a belief-like state which cannot have borderline cases: similar to belief but distinct in 
the ways that would make it have borderline cases. The two most compelling arguments 
for belief being a vague state are examples of degrees of confidence in belief and 
contradictions in conscious belief and behavior. It is clear that there exist uncertain or 
shaky beliefs in which it is indeterminable whether these mental states count as believing. 
Consider the following example. You are handed a lottery ticket and enter the lottery. Do 
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you believe that you will lose the lottery? If your degree of confidence in losing the 
lottery is above a certain threshold, then your answer to the question would count as a 
belief, but if your degree of confidence in losing the lottery is below a certain threshold, 
then your answer would not count as belief. However, the threshold for degree of 
confidence itself is vague; we have no way of determining what degree of confidence 
would qualify as belief, at least beyond if it appears to be a belief, therefore it is 
indeterminable whether your partial belief that you will lose the lottery qualifies as a 
belief. If the question ‘Is x a belief?’ is posed, the answer is that it is indeterminable 
because there exists a degree of confidence which make it impossible to pinpoint whether 
the degree of confidence lies above the threshold for belief or not. Therefore, it is vague 
whether this is a belief.   
Here, borderline cases of belief arise as a result of degrees of confidence in belief. 
A contradiction in belief and behavior can also serve as another way of arguing for the 
claim of a borderline case of belief. Schwitzgebel proposes an example of a borderline 
implicit belief in which someone has a contradictory belief and an implicit belief about 
race; a professor believes in the intellectual equality of the races. However, when not 
attending to (reflecting on) this belief, she is repeatedly racist in her interactions with her 
black students, either in person or in grading their papers (Schwitzgebel 2010, p. 532). 
Here, implicit bias is causing a contradiction in the professor’s belief about her beliefs 
and her actions influenced by these same beliefs. Here, it is vague whether someone 
believes something “under any circumstance in which they satisfy the criteria for holding 
the belief in question to some significant extent, but not sufficiently to count as 
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believing” (Archer 2017, 3033). It is vague in her circumstance whether she believes that 
the races are intellectually equal.  
The two cases here of vagueness associated with belief involve either uncertainty 
or a contradiction in reflective belief and implicit belief. However, from Rosenthal’s 
characterization of HOT, it does not appear that it can have degrees of confidence or 
contradictions that would cause it to not be a mental state at all. Even if a HOT existed 
which had a 0.8 degree of confidence in its content, the subject is still determinately 
having a thought. The thought might have a degree of confidence which would make it 
vague with regard to belief, but regarding being a mental state, it is determinately so. 
Although it can be vague whether or not a HOT is a belief, it cannot be vague that HOT 
is a mental state of some kind which resembles a belief.  
Further, a HOT cannot have contradictions between conscious and unconscious 
belief because what characterizes HOT is that its content is only one thing: that the 
subject is in the appropriate mental state. A contradictory belief would be that the subject 
is not in a conscious state. However, a HOT can only be that the subject is in a conscious 
state; the belief that one is not in a conscious state would not then be a HOT. However, 
since characteristics of mental states which are belief seem to be that they are vague, I 
will conclude that HOT is a belief-like mental state. Because HOT does not characterize 
the plausible cases of partial or vague belief, I am assuming that HOT does not satisfy the 
conditions of belief which would allow it to have borderline cases. Therefore, the type of 
belief that HOT characterizes cannot be a vague.  
 
2.2  Borderline Cases of Consciousness 
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If there are borderline cases to being in a conscious state; that is, to being in 
“mental states we are conscious of being in” (Rosenthal 1989, 335) but not borderline 
cases of the HOT that causes these mental states, then HOT cannot be a necessary 
condition of being in a conscious mental state. Rosenthal himself acknowledges in 
Higher Order Theories of Consciousness that “perceptions, emotions, and bodily 
sensations” (Rosenthal 2009, 245) present a difficulty for HOT theory. According to 
Rosenthal, perception is only conscious when accompanied by a suitable HOT. However, 
he acknowledges that the complexity of the physical processes involved in these physical 
states makes it difficult to chart the “subtle variations” (Rosenthal 2009, 245) of these 
states. The appearance of a HOT requires that there is an exact moment at which an 
unconscious state becomes conscious. But there appear to be mental states in which it is 
indeterminable whether the subject is aware of them or to what degree the subject is 
aware of them, therefore calling into question whether there exists awareness at all. 
Rosenthal claims the following about these subtle variations in perception, which could 
be the variations in color or flavor or other perceptual states of being which the subject is 
partially aware of: 
Plainly we do not have words for all the subtle variations in qualitative character that 
occur consciously in us. So it is unlikely that we have concepts for them. This presents a 
challenge for the HOT hypothesis, and an apparent advantage of inner sense. If our 
concepts cannot capture all the conscious differences among our qualitative states, neither 
can our thoughts (Rosenthal 2009, 8).  
 
By inner sense, Rosenthal is alluding to the inner sense or Higher Order 
Perception (HOP) theory of conscious states. HOP proposes that it is an inner perception 
that represents lower-order perception to the self, thus resulting in conscious mental 
states (MacKenzie 2007, 43). The advantage of HOP is that it allows for these subtle 
 20 
variations in perception which are not noticeable from the first-person perspective 
because there can presumably be borderline cases of higher-order perception, in which 
there is a minimal amount of perception being represented to the conscious self.  
However, Rosenthal concludes that although it is tempting to view perception as a 
result of higher-order perceptual states, these states would fail to explain the qualitative 
property of our conscious sensory states. Higher order perception would need to be 
explained by another higher order perception, which would eventually lead to an infinite 
regress (Rosenthal 2002, 409). D.M Armstrong, a proponent of HOP, introduces 
Rosenthal’s concern about perceptual states by giving an explanation for the apparent 
subtle variations in our conscious awareness. The example that Armstrong uses to 
support HOP is the long-distance truck driver. In his long-distance truck driver example, 
the driver has been driving for a large amount of time, but suddenly when making a turn 
realizes that he has been driving for a large amount of time without being aware of 
himself driving. His attention must have been directed at the act of driving, but he does 
not remember himself being attentive to his movements in this way (MacKenzie 2007, 
43). To understand this sort of event, Armstrong differentiates between perceptual 
consciousness and introspective consciousness, in which one can have perceptual 
consciousness without introspective consciousness (McKenzie, 45). Unlike HOT, HOP 
allows for borderline cases of conscious mental states with this crucial differentiation 
between perceptual and introspective consciousness; a mental state can be conscious 
perceptually without being conscious reflectively from the first-person perspective. In the 
truck driver case, there is clearly activity happening in the driver’s mind that would allow 
him to drive successfully, but the subject is not directly aware of his own awareness. 
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According to Armstrong, states of minimal awareness in which there is less activity in the 
brain are conscious by virtue of inner perception; there is a perceptual sense of self which 
allows the driver to drive without first-person awareness of this activity. Armstrong’s 
differentiation between perceptual and introspective consciousness allows for the subtle 
variations that Rosenthal claims challenge HOT.  
Antonio Damasio, a proponent of understanding consciousness in terms of a more 
spectrum-like scale of awareness, explains experiences such as the long distance truck 
driver by introducing an intermediary sense of self, which is what he calls “core 
consciousness” (Damasio 1999, 6). According to Damasio, oore consciousness is 
apparent in moments of reflexive action, when one is engaged in physical acts that don’t 
involve the awareness of the first-person self, such as the long-distance truck driver. 
People in this mode of being are able to navigate their surroundings but are not 
attentively focused on what their body is doing; they are “both there and not there, 
certainly awake, attentive in part, behaving for sure, bodily present but personally 
unaccounted for, absent without leave” (Damasio 1999, 6). Examples of this are activities 
which involve muscle memory or actions that have become so habitual that they require 
less attention.  
However, according to Rosenthal, if there appears the appropriate thought to the 
effect that one is in a conscious state, then that state is conscious. Therefore, Rosenthal 
would most likely argue that these examples of less focused attention that Damasio and 
Armstrong provide are in fact conscious states, and therefore are examples of 
circumstances in which the appropriate HOT would appear. The fact that people cannot 
remember their experiences does not demonstrate that they were not conscious while 
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experiencing them and having HOTs about these experiences. The driver’s lack of 
memory does not serve as an appropriate borderline case because it only exhibits a lack 
of memory of one’s conscious state, and this does not show that there was not a HOT 
present. Similarly, with the cases of partial attention, Rosenthal could presumably say 
that they do not adequately serve as a challenge to his theory, as not remembering being 
conscious of a certain actions that are reflexive or automatic does not prove that the 
action was not, in fact, completely conscious.  
However, there do appear to exist borderline cases which do not simply exhibit a 
lack of memory about consciousness, but rather a fluctuation of attentiveness which 
could serve as stronger examples of borderline cases. Giovana Colombetti, in Varieties of 
Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion 
argues that the varieties in our emotional states serve as examples the layers of conscious 
perception which contribute to our overall first-person perspective of our experience. 
Colombetti argues that there exist foreground and background feelings in “bodily” states 
such as emotions; by “bodily” she means emotions which are experienced physically in 
the body. The foreground feeling is the first-person experience of the emotion while the 
background is what either contributes to this first-person experience or has a more subtle 
and less attended to quality in the subject’s experience (Colombetti 2010, 297). In a 
single emotional experience, there are an incalculable amount of complex 
neurophysiological processes occurring that are not necessarily available to our first-
person field of awareness. Colombetti argues that there are moments in which attention is 
directed outside of ourselves: for example, on objects in the world rather than internal 
bodily moods, such as anxiety or even pain (Colombetti 2010, 302). We can attend to 
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these moods when triggered to or when we introspect on our mood. However, the mood 
comes in and out of focus of our first-person experience. When the experience is out of 
focus, it is less attended to. When it is in focus, we can have direct thoughts about it or 
richer phenomenal experiences of it. Since it appears to be indeterminable at what degree 
of attention to background experience an emotion can be considered conscious to the 
subject, it is vague whether these background emotional experiences are conscious.  
Could HOT allow for degrees of attention or focus in conscious experience? 
According to Rosenthal, a state is only conscious when attended to. This is suggested in 
the first criterium for HOT: ‘has the content of thinking one to be in a conscious state’. 
However, a HOT which does not itself have degrees of belief that one is in a conscious 
state would not allow for the subject to have degrees of conscious awareness which make 
these experiences vague regarding whether they are conscious or not. If the subject, in 
this moment of minimal awareness is not aware of being in a minimally aware state, then 
that state would not be conscious. However, if the subject were suddenly made aware of 
this minimally conscious state, the subject would be in a conscious state. Proponents of 
core or minimal consciousness such as Colombetti and Damasio would likely argue that 
Rosenthal’s definition of phenomenal consciousness itself is too narrow; a subject can 
have an experience he or she is not fully aware of. The ‘what it’s like’ feeling of being 
conscious can exist in a state which has a very low level of awareness from the first-
person perspective. Still, Rosenthal would likely consider even the transition from the 
coming in and out of phenomenal focus to require the acquisition and loss of a HOT. 
Perhaps Rosenthal would argue that these background experiences are lower-order 
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perceptions which have not yet undergone the appropriate belief that would allow them to 
be conscious. If there is any degree of awareness at all, there is a HOT.  
2.3  Ned Block’s refrigerator case and objections  
However, Ned Block’s refrigerator hum case offers an example of a borderline 
case which seems to avoid this proposition that the appearance of HOT fluctuates 
alongside the fluctuating degree of attention directed at a perceptual state. Block argues 
that phenomenal perception is not reducible to representation because the “phenomenal 
character of perception goes beyond its representational content” (Block, 2010, p. 25). 
According to Block, there is no good reason to believe that the subject needs to be 
attending to his or her own representational states in order for them to be considered 
conscious; attention is an altogether different thing than consciousness. Similar to 
Colombetti, he argues that in a single moment there are millions of perceptions occurring 
in the subject’s experience regardless of whether or not they are represented to the first-
person perspective. Block calls this the overflow argument, which states that the richness 
of a phenomenal experience overflows our ability to think about or even report about it 
(Block, 2011, p. 1). Although all perceptual experience has the potential to be represented 
cognitively, only a small part of these perceptual experiences can be “cognitively 
accessed” (Block 2011, p. 1) according to Block. These perceptual experiences are not 
non-conscious, but also not completely phenomenally conscious either. For Block, “one 
can be aware of what one is not attending to”, meaning that perceptual awareness can 
exist without first-person attention or representation of the perception (Block 2003, p. 7). 
Most importantly, while it is quite minimal, this awareness does seem to have 
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phenomenally quality. The refrigerator hum case demonstrates this borderline case of 
consciousness.  
The refrigerator hum case is as follows. Person x is in the kitchen when the 
refrigerator stops humming. The moment it stops, Person x realizes that it has been 
humming the whole time and he did not notice until is stopped (Block, 2003, p. 7). 
However, in order to know that the humming stopped, Person x must have been aware 
that there was humming in the first place; in order to perceive a change, there must have 
been an awareness of the before and after. Here the differentiation between attention and 
awareness is significant. According to Block, attention is when one is thinking or feeling 
something directly from the first-person perspective, while awareness is not necessarily 
acknowledged fully from the first-person perspective (Block 2003, p. 7). Here, something 
is experienced, but does not have the subject’s attention. I would argue that this 
awareness even has phenomenal properties regardless of the subject’s lack of complete 
attention to these properties.  
The fact that Person x has the potential to direct his attention to something in his 
perceptual field indicates that this something has some of the characteristics of a 
conscious state; it exists somewhere in Person x’s peripheral awareness. This minimal 
degree of attention is especially apparent if, for example, the refrigerator hum were to 
motivate behavior (for example, if Person x becomes surprised at hearing the refrigerator 
hum stop or felt uncomfortable for an unknown reason when in the kitchen). As the 
attention on an object in a subject’s perceptual field dims, it becomes less a part of his or 
her phenomenal experience, but the point at which it completely leaves the subject’s 
phenomenal experience impossible, from the first and third person perspective, to 
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pinpoint. From the first-person perspective, I cannot cognitively access the variations and 
fluctuations in my perceptual experience, while from the third person perspective we do 
not yet have a way to empirically measure the existence and non-existence of 
consciousness.  
To reiterate, the refrigerator case exemplifies a borderline case because it is 
indeterminable from either of these perspectives whether or not Person x was conscious 
of the hum at time x when the refrigerator was humming. All we can claim with 
confidence at this point is that Person x has a partial or minimal awareness of the hum at 
time x that is demonstrated in his realizing that it stopped. According to Block, Person x 
would be conscious by virtue of perceptual awareness rather than attention; however, 
even if conscious, it is indeterminable at what point we can claim that Person x is no 
longer conscious of the hum. How much could first-person awareness or focus on 
perceptual content decrease before we can no longer claim that this content is 
phenomenally conscious? The answer is that it is indeterminable.   
A proponent of HOT would likely claim that this does not characterize a 
borderline case of consciousness for the following reason. The existence of these varying 
degrees of phenomenal awareness does not indicate that a HOT has not occurred at some 
point in the transition. This ‘coming to’ when the refrigerator hum stops, and A realizes it 
has been humming indicates a transition from perceptual awareness to full first-person 
awareness. A proponent of HOT would likely argue that this transition indicates that a 
HOT has occurred which allows the subject to believe that he or she is conscious of the 
hum. There does not appear any reason to argue that HOT cannot occur alongside 
varying levels of attention. For example, it is conceivable that I can have a non-conscious 
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thought to the effect that I am in a conscious state along with a low level of attention to 
this thought, thereby resulting in a minimally conscious state.  
Although I admit that this may be a possibility in some cases of minimal attention 
to our perceptual fields, this does not exactly characterize what is happening in the 
refrigerator hum case. First of all, this attention would have to be non-conscious as well, 
as HOT is unconscious, and increased attention suggests becoming increasingly 
conscious of HOT. However, even if this attention is somehow non-conscious as well, it 
characterizes a different kind of case. Specifically, it characterizes a case in which there 
is an uncertainty about an experience that becomes clear with increased attention. A HOT 
alongside varying attention levels characterizes refrigerator hum case 2. In refrigerator 
hum case 2, when the hum stops, the subject experiencing the hum with minimal 
attention before it stops suddenly becomes confident that there was a hum at the moment 
that the hum stops. He was uncertain about the hum before; therefore he had a partial 
belief-like state about his consciousness of the hum. There was a low level of attention 
directed at the belief-like state itself, making it uncertain. However, after the hum stops, 
his consciousness of the hum is settled as true.  
This scenario depicts an experience where there is no indeterminacy that there is a 
mental state occurring to the effect that one is in a conscious state, but the attention 
directed at the belief is barely there until something triggers the attention to increase. 
Although this case is possible, it does not eliminate the possibility of Block’s refrigerator 
hum case, which is a more plausible case. In Block’s case, the subject does not become 
more confident in his belief about the hum; instead, the subject did not even realize there 
was a hum that was clearly being experienced. In this case, it is indeterminable whether 
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the subject was conscious of the hum before it stops. There is an element of surprise at 
the realization that he was hearing the hum the entire time. This is a case of vague 
consciousness which is not a case of vague believing because there could not have been 
any prior “minimal” belief that the subject was in a conscious state. Even if the HOT was 
accompanied with varying levels of attention, if there was any belief to the effect that the 
subject is in a conscious state, the subject would have been attending to the hum (but the 
subject was not attending to the hum before it stopped). In the refrigerator hum example, 
the perception of the humming was not experienced fully by the first-person self, but 
there still existed a perceptual awareness experienced by some other part of the subject 
which was part of the subject’s perceptual field of awareness.  
However, some philosophers argue that despite examples such as the refrigerator 
case, phenomenal consciousness cannot have borderline consciousness because it differs 
in kind from other things which admit vagueness. In Vagueness and Zombies, Jonathon 
Simon argues that phenomenal consciousness can never have borderline cases because 
‘consciousness’ does not identify the same kind of usage norm that ‘baldness’ does. A 
case which is vague is not simply vague because it is indeterminate; there are other 
factors (Simon, 2016, p. 6). In the case of baldness, having 5 hairs is a borderline case of 
baldness when it is vague if baldness is equivalent to 5 hairs. According to Simon, the 
reason that this is a borderline case is not just that it is indeterminable whether a person 
who has 5 hairs is bald, but also that there is “an explanatory usage norm accounting for 
the feature of the case you are responding to” (Simon 2016, p. 8). By “explanatory usage 
norm” Simon means that it is a result of the attitudes of people in a given social context 
that we find 5 hairs to be vague, rather than an a priori principle of baldness which is 
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objectively true in all contexts. The same is true for tallness. When I say that a person is 
tall the context is implied. For example, when saying that a 5in blade of grass is tall, I am 
speaking under the implicit context of blades of grass rather than people.  
In the case of phenomenal consciousness, Simon argues that there are no 
explanatory usage norms as in the case of baldness or tallness which explain the 
appropriate context of calling something conscious. The indicator of whether a state is 
phenomenally conscious is how it feels to be phenomenally conscious. Phenomenal 
consciousness, unlike things which can have borderline cases, is not the product of 
linguistic usage norms or context, therefore it cannot itself be vague (Simon, 2016, p.16). 
Rather, phenomenal consciousness is a physical thing that is “really present in the world” 
(O’Rourke, 10). Simon argues that although we may not be aware of the cutoff between 
unconscious and conscious perception by reference to physical facts, our ignorance about 
these physical facts does not give us reason to conclude that experiences which seem 
vague to us are vague. There are “hidden features that we do not, at present, fully 
understand” (Simon, 2016, p. 17) from our human knowledge. 
Simon’s argument is that the mere fact that we do not know which states are 
conscious from a scientific standpoint is not a good reason to believe that consciousness 
is vague. Michael Tye agrees with this claim, and goes further in saying that even from 
our first-person perspective there can be no vagueness to our experience. It’s difficult to 
believe that there can be vagueness to an experiences such as feeling pain or seeing. As 
long as there is a way that it feels to be experiencing, there cannot be borderline cases. 
Michael Tye argues the following about the lack of vagueness to phenomenal experience:   
“The intensity level or richness of a subject’s experience can vary—think, for example of 
the experiences one undergoes when one is falling asleep or just waking up, and contrast 
that with the experience one has when looking at a garden full of flowers on a bright 
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summer’s day—but in each case there is something it is like for the subject (Tye, 2002, p. 
681).  
According to Simon and Tye, the fact that there are degrees of consciousness is not 
incompatible with a state being determinably either conscious or not conscious. Even 
with minimal consciousness levels, such as in the refrigerator hum case, there is either 
something it is like to be experiencing it or not. Applying this concept to HOT 
specifically, the argument would likely be that our phenomenal experience is a direct 
measure of whether a HOT has occurred. If we are uncertain about whether our 
experience is phenomenally conscious, this does not necessarily mean that it is vague.  
However, although these arguments are compelling in that they take seriously our 
first-person experience of our experiences, these arguments fail to address the vagueness 
of conscious experience. There is an important difference between the vagueness of an 
experience and vagueness as to whether there is an experience (Tye, 1996). The 
vagueness of whether there is an experience is what Simon and Tye are claiming does not 
exist; there cannot be a vagueness to our own first-person knowledge of our experience. 
There is no question as to whether I am seeing red or touching a surface, even when my 
consciousness of these events is partial. The vagueness of the experience itself, however, 
characterizes the degree to which the experience itself is experienced by the subject. 
Rosenthal’s conditions for phenomenal consciousness does not allow for a subject to be 
unaware of an experience while the experience is phenomenally conscious. In other 
words, it does not allow for a degree of consciousness which is not experienced fully by 
the subject’s first-person perspective such as the refrigerator hum case or Colombetti’s 
account of emotional background experience.  
Although in the refrigerator case it is indisputable that the person is having an 
experience when perceiving the hum, it is indeterminable whether we can consider the 
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subject, in this moment, to be conscious of the hum if there existed only a partial 
awareness that was not even acknowledged by the subject during the time before the 
refrigerator stopped humming.The same is true for the emotional background experience. 
It is possible to determine whether an individual has a conscious experience of a certain 
emotion, but the varieties and fluctuations of this emotional experience are impossible to 
claim as determinably conscious or unconscious within the binary universe of 
Rosenthal’s standard for consciousness.  
Furthermore, Simon and Tye appear to be relying on our own intuitions about our 
sense of self in order to indicate the moment we become phenomenally conscious. To 
them, each case is obvious; I am either phenomenally conscious or I am not. However, 
the question about borderline cases is not whether an experience is conscious from our 
first-person point of view, but whether the consciousness of an experience can be vague 
itself. Answering this question requires more than our first-person perspective. For 
Simon, Tye, and Rosenthal, phenomenal consciousness and first-person awareness are 
the same thing -- but this conflation fails to address what is happening in, e.g., the 
refrigerator hum case, where there is awareness of an experience without attention 
directed at it. Thus, as Block addresses, attention and awareness are not necessarily 
concurrent because perceptual experiences which are not first-person accessible are still 
conscious by virtue of being experienced perceptually. 
There is a threshold of attention in these scenarios that is vague itself, causing 
there to exist borderline cases in which it is indeterminate whether the level of first-
person attention is high enough to count as conscious. In the next section, I will draw 
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from the phenomenology of John-Paul Sartre, a 20th century French philosopher, to 
continue the argument for borderline cases of consciousness.  
 
III. Sartre’s ‘in-itself’ and Borderline Cases of Consciousness 
 
In this chapter I introduce John-Paul Sartre’s theory of the ‘in-itself’, the most 
fundamental and basic ontological level of self, in order to support the claim that there 
are cases of borderline consciousness experience in which the first-person self is not fully 
present. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre argues that there exists a pre-reflective self-
consciousness, which is an “immediate, non-cognitive relation of the self to itself” (Sartre 
BN, liii). To Sartre, all experience is necessarily conscious by virtue of having the self-
referential feature of belonging to the appropriate self.  
Sartre takes the human being to be made up of “facticity and transcendence” 
(Sartre BN, 56): facticity is the inescapable, physiological reality of the body and the 
body’s functions, or the “fact of man” (Sartre BN, 58) while transcendence is the ways in 
which we escape this fact with self-creation and will. Unlike Rosenthal, Sartre finds it 
necessary to grant consciousness to every physical and mental human state, as “there is 
no inertia in consciousness” (Sartre BN, 61). There is no possibility that one conscious 
state can give consciousness to another state without causing an infinite regress of 
consciousness causing states. Every state must fundamentally be conscious of itself as 
belonging to a self.  
According to Sartre, something cannot be unconsciously conscious of having a 
certain content. At the most basic level, before any external stimuli, a state has the 
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content of itself by virtue of being or existing. Sartre describes consciousness as having a 
“translucent” property (Catalano, 34), as its content is whatever the external world makes 
us conscious of. The self of the pre-reflective consciousness is one that Sartre calls the 
“in-itself” (Sartre BN, 120). In this in-itself,   
“there is not a particle of being which is not wholly within itself without distance...A is A 
means that A exists in an infinite compression with an infinite destiny” (Sartre BN, 
120).   
By “without distance”, Sartre means that the self of the ‘in-itself’ is a presence to oneself 
that is not reflectively acknowledged, but rather the identity relation is known reflexively. 
Sartre argues that this referential relation is necessary to and prior to any subject’s 
awareness of mental states (Sartre BN, 121). 
Sartre’s concept of the ‘in-itself’ offers support of the view that perceptual 
experience has borderline cases, in which the experience is not attended to fully by the 
first-person perspective. The in-itself is the self of the pre-reflective consciousness, in 
which there is an implicit awareness of self. Although Sartre’s view on consciousnesses 
is radical in that he takes all mental states to be conscious such as dreams, repressed 
desires, and implicit beliefs 5, he argues that there exist cases in which the subject is 
minimally aware of an experience that is occurring consciously in the in-itself. Sartre 
argues that the subject himself does not appear in some acts of consciousness. Sartre’s 
example of what he calls “nonpositional consciousness” (Sartre BN, 48) is the following: 
“When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in 
contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-
be-overtaken, etc., and nonpositional consciousness of consciousness. In fact, I am then 
plunged into the world of objects; it is they which constitute the unity of my 
                                                 
5  Sartre argues that the Freudian conception of the unconscious which is shared by many philosophers fails 
to answer how the “repressed drive can disguise itself if it does not include (1) the consciousness of being 
repressed [and] (2) the consciousness of being pushed back because it is what it is...” (Sartre BN, 53) 
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consciousness; it is they which present themselves with values, with attractive and 
repellant qualities – but I have disappeared; I have annihilated myself. There is no place 
for me on this level. And this is not a matter of chance, due to a momentary lapse of 
attention, but happens because of the very structure of consciousness (Sartre BN, 48)”. 
 
What Sartre means by an annihilation of himself is that in these moments of 
absorption with the external world, there is no awareness of the self as experiencing. The 
world of objects is experienced only perceptually. Here, there is no belief that the subject 
is in a conscious state because, as Sartre argues, there is no subject present. This world of 
objects is experienced by the in-itself: the “consciousness in its fundamental selfness” 
(Sartre BN, 103). The in-itself is the self which does not contain a conceptual notion of 
self; it is conscious by virtue of being itself and having the content of being itself. Sartre 
claims that it is not a lapse in attention which causes the subject to not appear, but rather 
that the experience of being absorbed in a painting is being experienced by the self of the 
in-itself. 
I do not wish to suggest that every perceptual state is conscious, as Sartre attempts 
to do; however, the notion of the in-itself challenges the idea that the subject of 
experience is a singular, one-dimensional thing which undergoes direct experience as 
HOT theory suggests. This is significant because if, instead, the experiencing subject is 
considered to encompass cases of more minimal or bodily  awareness, then the subject 
can incorporate the refrigerator hum, or the following example proposed by Searle: 
Although I might not be attending to the “feeling of the chair against my back...the 
tightness of my shoes... all these phenomena are part of my conscious awareness” 
(Searle, 1992, p. 137) As Block’s overflow argument claims, we are conscious of a great 
number of things in our surroundings in varying degrees which we do not directly 
perceive from the first-person perspective. The significance of these cases in which the 
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first-person perspective is not present, at least fully, in the experience of a certain 
perceptual experiences serves to show that the degree of consciousness of perceptual 
experience cannot be expressed necessarily via HOT.  
The fact that there exist borderline cases of conscious experience does not suggest 
that we should not take seriously our first-person experience of consciousness. However, 
consciousness may not be a thing which has sharp boundaries in a physical sense, or at 
least one which has been discovered empirically. Since consciousness is a concept which 
picks out a particular part of human experience, it can be treated in the same way that we 
treat concepts such as baldness in that there is no physical description of the phenomena 
beyond our experience of it. We don’t yet have a robust explanation of the neurochemical 
brain processes which cause consciousness, therefore there is no way to determine 
whether there are sharp boundaries to consciousness. This is not a reason to say that there 
aren’t sharp boundaries beyond our physical knowledge, but at this point if the term 
consciousness is picking out an experience rather than a physical process, it must have 
vague instantiations due to the degrees of awareness and attention in first-person 
perceptual experience.  
Given that HOT is cannot be vague and, as I have attempted to argue, phenomenal 
consciousness can be vague, HOT is not a necessary condition of conscious perceptual 
states.  
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Conclusion 
Rosenthal’s HOT does not accommodate borderline cases such as the ones 
described above, therefore it does not address the complexity of phenomenal 
consciousness. HOT theorist Gennaro offers an account of HOT in which the thought is 
not an entirely separate mental state from both the lower order and higher order conscious 
state, but rather there are multiple parts of the HOT: perhaps an account such as this one 
could accommodate for borderline cases, if there were more than one necessary condition 
for a conscious mental state that included HOT and something else. I find it plausible that 
there could be a way in which HOT could maintain the intuition that consciousness is not 
an innate feature of the perceptual state itself, without suggesting an on/off feature of 
consciousness in which a subject is either aware of his or her mental states or not. 
Alternatively, a theory of HOT which calculates levels of consciousness in terms of 
quantity of HOTs, or something resembling this could be a way to preserve intuitions 
against higher order perception without threatening discussions surrounding the existence 
of animal consciousness and animal pain.  
 In later works, I hope to continue to bring continental thinkers, and especially 
phenomenologists such as Husserl, Sartre, and Merlau-Ponty into the discussion in order 
to explore ways of viewing consciousness as a complex spectrum of pre-reflective and 
reflective awareness, both perceptual and first-person awareness.   
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